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Abstract
Title: Credit ratings and government bonds: Evidence before, during and after the Euro-
pean debt crisis
This project investigates if there was any influence of credit rating agencies and long-term
government bond yields on each other before, during and after Europe’s sovereign debt
crisis. This is addressed by estimating the relationship and causality between sovereign
debt ratings or bond yields and macroeconomic and structural variables following a dif-
ferent procedure to explain ratings and bond yields. It is found evidence that, in distressed
periods, ratings and yields do affect one another. This suggests that a rating downgrade
might create a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading relatively stable countries to default.
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Purpose of Project - General Overview
The global financial crisis of 2007 - 2010, which was once seen as an issue in the US
sub-prime mortgage market and the bankruptcy of U.S. banks, evolved into a sovereign
debt crisis in the Euro zone, with most European countries facing: (i) an abrupt increase
in the government bond yields and spreads against the German Bund; together with (ii)
successive downgrade of their credit ratings. In fact, until the end of 2009, Fitch Ratings,
Inc. (“Fitch") would downgrade Greece’s credit rating from A- to BBB+ with a negative
outlook, being the first time in almost 10 years that Greece had a rating below an A grade
by any of the three major credit rating agencies.1 The Greece situation just intensified
the possibility of the Euro area collapse and increased the cost of financing of several
countries, where the ones most affected were those with fragile fiscal situation. At the end
of 2014, almost five years after the first bailout program during the European sovereign
debt crisis, and after the austerity plans introduced by the countries most affected by it,
Europe was facing a slow and long recovery. The majority of these countries saw their
government bond yields and spreads fall to levels lower than the ones before the crisis
was installed, some of them registered minimum values of both long- and short-term
bond yields in their history. Nevertheless, credit ratings did not follow the exponential
decrease in the yields, being some, still, considered as a speculative investment.
This thesis intends to explain the impact of the three most well know credit rating agencies
(“CRA”), Fitch, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) and Standard & Poor’s
Financial Services LLC (“Standard & Poor’s” or “S&P”), during the European sovereign
debt crisis. In this context, it pretends to complement previous studies on the impact
1In “Tough words and and hard budgets for eurozone” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
0d5a6622-e4b4-11de-96a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz3vkmaNgws)
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of sovereign rating changes and sovereign bond yield spreads on one another by using
updated data (until December 31st, 2014) and through an analysis that will be performed
comparing the sovereign debt crisis period to the period before and after. In this sense,
this paper pretends to assess how sovereign credit ratings influenced and were influenced
by the bond yield spreads before, during and after the crisis.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 it will be provided a
review of related literature on the methodology behind sovereign debt ratings estimation
and their role in the markets.
In Chapter 3, it will be given a description of the datasets used and reason of their appli-
cation providing a methodological introduction.
Moreover, it will be described the empirical analysis and results of the impact of changes
in the credit ratings issued by the CRA on the yield spread of sovereign bonds, vis-à-vis
the German Bund, and vice-versa.
The final part, Chapter 4, concludes with a summary of the thesis’s main findings and
provides opportunities for future research.
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Literature Review
During the 1990s, the occurrence of several financial crises that affected the world fi-
nancial markets led to an increase in popularity of the study of how CRA assessed the
government’s creditworthiness and how ratings influenced the markets. More recently,
the last financial crisis increased the concern about Greece’s, Portugal’s and Ireland’s
capacity to pay their debts. This made investors turn to ratings as a measure of the cred-
itworthiness of these countries and how the European Union was implementing measures
to prevent a worldwide financial contagion.
In fact, the perception of sovereign risk of default published by Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s, and Fitch has a major role in the markets since it might ease the placement
of sovereign debt in the primary markets. It also has a major impact for investors as the
credit rating works as an “insurance” against the likelihood of default. Moreover, some
institutional investors are obligated, either by law or their own statutes, to purchase and
hold bonds with a certain minimum rating. Credit ratings are also used by regulators and
market participants to establish the capital requirements and this could impact the portfo-
lios since only highly rated assets are eligible as collateral to obtain credit. Under Basel
II, countries, banks and corporations use the standardized approach to credit risk, which
relies on credit ratings issued by external CRA to assess its own regulatory capital (i.e.,
the amount of capital required by the financial regulator).
A downgrade can, therefore, lead to a change in the demand for certain sovereign bonds
hence increasing these countries yields and spreads against a benchmark (in Europe, spe-
cially within the Euro area, it is usually used the German Bund as a benchmark).
In what regards the literature concerning sovereign ratings, we are going to focus on
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two main categories. The first category concerns research that analyzes the determinants
of sovereign credit ratings issued by CRA. Cantor and Packer (1996) analyzed a cross-
section of 45 countries by applying OLS regressions to ratings and concluded that the
rating is determined, mainly, by six economic factors - GDP per capita, GDP growth,
inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default history - and that they
are strongly correlated with market spreads. More recent studies by Bhatia (2002) and
Afonso et al. (2007), the latter using a panel of 130 countries from 1970 to 2005, show
similar conclusions with minor changes regarding the explanatory variables.
Other studies try to explain the impact of ratings on the yields and spreads of sovereign
debt. Cantor and Packer (1996) realized that rating announcements directly affect the mar-
ket although these often already anticipated the effects of this change (via the rise/decline
of the spreads on the days before the announcement). Brooks et al. (2004) concluded,
instead, that “only Sovereign ratings downgrades convey information to the market”.
The second category of research focused on the impact of CRA announcements during fi-
nancial crisis. Ferri (1999) studied the impact during the East Asian financial crisis, at the
end of the 1990s, and concluded that rating agencies’ sovereign ratings may have aggra-
vated it and that the CRA have failed to preventively warn the markets against the crisis.
Mora (2006) then analyzed the “tremendous power to influence market expectations on a
country” as pointed by Ferri (1999) and found out that ratings tend to be sticky (inertia of
sovereign ratings) and that they remain over-conservative after a crisis but that the impact
should be analyzed more carefully.
In recent years, and due to the European debt crisis, some researchers used these concept
to assess the relationship between the crisis and the CRA’s ratings. Gärtner et al. (2011)
reformulated the analysis, adding the yield spread as an estimator of the country’s rating
and concluded that there is evidence that CRA may had a role during the crisis. Moreover,
De Santis (2012) reached a similar result for the same period using the credit rating from
each CRA as an estimator for the yields of the Euro area countries.
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Another topic covered by some of these studies and by other researchers is the spillover
effect of one country rating downgrade and its impact in other countries’ ratings. Is-
mailescu and Kazemi (2010), addressed this matter by evaluating the impact of credit
rating changes, positive and negative, on the CDS spread of both the event country and
other emerging economies. They concluded that there is evidence of immediate reaction
of CDS markets to credit rating events.
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) and De Santis (2012) applied the same rationale for the
European Monetary Union (“EMU’) for the period up to the European sovereign debt cri-
sis (roughly from 1999 to 2011, depending on the research) reaching a similar conclusion.
They found that the early stage of the crisis was driven by the Greek debt crisis and that
during the rest of the crisis period there is evidence for contagious from Greece, Portugal,
Ireland and, on a lower scale, Spain and Italy (commonly referred as “PIGS” or “PIIGS”).
This project contributes to the existent literature by explaining government bond yield
spreads vis-à-vis the German Bund and sovereign credit ratings with a larger time period,
covering the pre-European crisis, the crisis itself and post-crisis and using up to date data.
This allows to capture how ratings and yields affect one another in different periods of a
crisis and if there is, effectively, an impact.
Firstly, we will use in this study the linear regression approach following Cantor and
Packer (1996) or Afonso et al. (2007) rationale and applying to panel data, regressions
models for the ratings and yields.
Secondly, it will be used ordered models following Afonso et al. (2007) or Mora (2006)
as ratings are a discrete variable and have different categories. The fact that the model
used implies that the difference between two categories is the same for any two categories
will not be addressed in this study.
Moreover, in this study we will not only study the impact of government ratings on gov-
ernment bond yields spreads but also the impact of the latter in the ratings. With this
comparison we expect to assess the impact and what truly affects what throughout time.
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Discussion of the Topic
3.1 Data
As referred above, credit rating agencies are specialized in the assessment of the likeli-
hood of default of sovereign and corporate issuers. Due to the expansion of the number
of countries issuing securities, the globalization of the capital market and the implemen-
tation of laws and regulations as the Basel II, these agencies became protagonists in the
financial markets.
This work project intends to study how far the CRA influenced or were influenced by the
yield spreads of the countries during the crisis and what was this relation before and after
this period.
For that purpose, we analyze quarterly 10-year yields and spreads, vis-à-vis the German
Bund, from 12 economies: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom (U.K.)1. The choice of these
countries is based on their differences namely, the size of the countries and the level of
distress of these countries during the European sovereign debt crisis (“ESDC”) making
them the perfect fit for the analysis. The sample period runs from the first quarter of
2002 (introduction of the Euro) until the last quarter of 2014. It was not considered more
updated data in order for the financial data not to be influenced by the quantitative easing
("QE") program launched in early 2015 by the European Central Bank ("ECB"). In this
sense, it is used the value of the yields of the last available business day of each quarter.
Moreover, it is used the ratings issued by Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s for all
1Luxembourg is not considered in the sample due to the large amount of missing data.
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these countries as they held together, in 2014, a global market share of roughly 90 percent
2. Although the analysis is similar for each rating, CRA do not use the same credit rating
notation therefore they were translated, based on previous literature (as used by Afonso
et al. (2007)), into a numerical scale raging from 22 to 1 respectively, AAA or Aaa to D.
In addition, a positive or negative credit watch announcement can foresee a rating change
in the same direction in a near future. Taking this, it will also be analyzed the credit watch
announcements from each CRA which will be translated to the numerical scale referred
above and it will be valued±0.5 depending on it being a positive or negative credit watch.
Table 1 on page 37, depicts the numerical conversion of each rating scheme, which sub-
sequently will be used for the empirical analysis.
Figure 1 (page 35 and 36) show the evolution of the countries’ 10-year sovereign bond
yield against the evolution of the ratings between the first quarter of 2002 and the last
quarter of 2014. This figure shows a high correlation, during the crisis period, between
rating changes and the increase on the yields, also revealing how ratings tend to have
inertia (namely before and after this period).
Furthermore, the empirical analysis uses macroeconomic data as evidenced in the litera-
ture (from Cantor and Packer (1996) to Afonso et al. (2007)):
• GDP Growth - In theory, higher GDP growth increases the capacity for govern-
ments to repay their debt and thus it is expected a negative impact on the yields and
positive on ratings. Quarterly data on real GDP growth is from Eurostat.
• GDP per capita - A larger income per capita, measured in thousand euro per capita,
is anticipated in more developed (i.e., stable, strong) countries and it is expected to
have a negative impact on yields and a positive one on ratings. Quarterly data on
GDP per capita is from Eurostat.
• Government surplus (i.e., surplus or deficit) - A higher deficit signals that the gov-
2Table 1 in "Credit Rating Agencies’ 2014 market share calculations for the purposes of Article 8d of
the CRA Regulation" (2014) by European Securities and Markets Authority
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ernment may not be able to repay its liabilities or that it will tax its population to
cover its expenses. It is expected a negative effect on yields and positive on ratings.
Quarterly data on government surplus as percentage of GDP is from Eurostat.
• Inflation - Inflation rate may point for structural stability since stronger economies
have lower, but still positive, inflation in the medium term. A negative influence
is expected for this on the rating and a positive for the yields. Quarterly data on
inflation rate is from OECD.
• Unemployment - Distress periods usually lead to high unemployment rates and,
consequently, an increase in the social and economical burden of fiscal policy and
social benefits. A positive impact on the yields and negative on ratings is expected.
Quarterly unemployment rate is from Eurostat.
• Government debt - A higher government debt represents a higher risk of default
and thus it is expected to have a positive effect on the yields and a negative one on
ratings. Quarterly data on government debt as percentage of GDP is from Eurostat.
• Current account balance - A higher current account balance (external balance) sig-
nals that the government and/or companies rely heavily on domestic funds and,
therefore, the economy tendency to over-consume “in house”. It is expected a pos-
itive impact on ratings and negative on yields. Quarterly data measured as billions
of euro is from Eurostat.
The descriptive statistics for each variable can be found in Table A.1 of Appendix A. It
is worth noting the high values for the ratings which, considering the whole period, are
equivalent to Aa2/Aa3 or an AA/AA- (respectively for Moody’s and S&P/Fitch). These
results are clearly above what it would be expected taking such a severe crisis as the one
lived in Europe and the fact that Greece defaulted in time being (which would give a
numerical value of one or two depending on the rating scale). A simple explanation is the
amount of AAA rating countries used for the purposes of this project (6 out of 12) that
had triple-A rating for the majority, if not all period under analysis.
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Moreover, the average of 4.20% for 10-year government bond yield and 1.15% for the
10-year government bond yield spread are also considerably low taking the crisis (again,
the use of low-yield countries reduces considerably this value).
Such values could be more accurately analyzed if we split the all sample size in three
periods: (i) before the crisis (from the first quarter of 2002 until the second quarter of
2008); (ii) crisis (from the third quarter of 2008 until the forth quarter of 2012); and (iii)
post-crisis (from the first quarter of 2013 until the last quarter of 2014). These sub-periods
will be used throughout the text for further analysis.
Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 of Appendix A show the descriptive statistics for each of the
periods respectively, pre-, during and post-crisis.
From these it is perceived the gradual decline of the average ratings over time reflecting
the situation lived in Europe. In what regards the average 10-year yields and spreads, it is
possible to see a spike during the crisis and a decrease afterwards and, in the case of the
yield, to levels below the ones before the crisis.
Notwithstanding the decrease of bond yields to minimum values from the first to the
last period, the yield spreads did not follow this tendency, reflecting the change on the
perception of the countries’ credit risk from one period to the other. In fact, whereas in
the pre-crisis period investors assumed a similar risk for all countries, in the post-crisis
one, it becomes evident to investors the difference in the credit risk associated with less
fiscally stable and more fiscally stable countries.
More interesting than only considering the average yield, is to check the standard de-
viation, as a simple measure for markets volatility (i.e., risk) over time. The standard
deviation of the yield was around 0.59% before the beginning of the crisis escalating to
a value of approximately 3.99% during the crisis (decreasing to 2.26% after this period).
This increase clearly shows, in a superficial analysis, the reaction of the markets to such
a distress period. This instability lead to maximum values of the yields in the PIGS,
with Greece’s yield achieving a value of approximately 35% for the 10-year bond (and
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1,143% for the 1-year bond) before it was withdrawn of the market (a further analysis of
the volatility will not be pursued during the current study).
3.2 Methodology
On a first section, the study of the relationship between ratings and yield spreads will
partly follow the methodology used by Afonso et al. (2007).
The linear panel model used to estimate the yield spread Yi,t (vis-à-vis the German Bund)
of a country i (i = 1, . . . , N), at time t (t = 1, . . . , T ), is described as follow:
Yi,t = α + βRRi,t + γXi,t + ci + εi,t (3.1)
where Ri,t is the rating of the country i at time t, Xi,t is a vector containing the time-
varying variables previously mentioned, the macroeconomic series, ci is an individual
effect and εi,t represents an error term.
Moreover, it will be used a similar model to estimate the rating Ri,t of the same country i
(i = 1, . . . , N), at time t (t = 1, . . . , T ):
Ri,t = α + βY Yi,t + γXi,t + ci + εi,t (3.2)
where Yi,t is the 10 year yield spread of country i at time t and Xi,t is a vector containing
the macroeconomic series, ci is an individual effect and εi,t represents the error term.
Generally speaking, to estimate this equation one can use pooled Ordinary Least Squares
("OLS"), fixed effect or random effect. According to Wooldridge (2001), “random ef-
fect is synonymous with zero correlation between the observed explanatory variables and
the individual effect” whereas “the term fixed effect (. . .) means that one is allowing for
arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect ci and the observed explanatory vari-
ables Xi,t”. The pooled OLS regression method ignores the panel structure of the data
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and purely estimates α, β and γ as a multiple linear regression.
If the individual effect is uncorrelated with the regressors, E[ci|Xi,t, Yi,t] = 0, then the
random effect estimation is preferable. Nevertheless, if this condition is not verified, both
pooled OLS and random effect provide inconsistent estimates and hence one should use
fixed effects. In our study, it is expected for the individual effect to be correlated with the
regressors hence it will be used the fixed effects estimation.
Moreover, heteroskedasticity is present in the model if the variance of the error terms
changes. Consequently, we correct for heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors.
The main purpose of the first section is to obtain robust indicators on how CRA can
influence or are influenced by the yield spreads of the countries. For that we will use
macroeconomic factors and credit ratings/spreads as a proxy for risk as it is commonly
done in comparable studies. On the contrary, with the division of the analysis in subperi-
ods it is expected to contribute to the literature by studying how this relation has changed
over different economic periods.
On a second section, and taking the limited (i.e., discrete) structure of the credit ratings,




Xi,t + εi,t (3.3)
where Xi,t is the vector of variables that explains the variation in ratings and εi,t is the
disturbance term that are assumed to be normally distributed.
Due to the limited structure of the credit ratings, several cut-off points will be computed
to establish the boundaries for each rating level. R∗i,t, which represents a continuous
evaluation of the country’s rating, will then result in the estimated discrete country’s rating




Before proceeding to the analysis of the estimation models, it is important to analyze the
correlation between the variables as well as the correlations between the CRA and the
10-year yield spread, separately, within countries. Table A.5 through A.8 in Appendix A
show the correlation matrices of the parameters for the four periods above mentioned (all
sample period, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis).
From the first table we can realize the negative correlation between the CRA and the 10-
year yield spreads confirming the intuition that an increase in the rating would result in a
decrease in the spreads, and vice-versa. In addition, the majority of the macroeconomic
variables’ correlation with the 10-year yield spread meet the expected relation beforehand
stated (with the exception of inflation).
Again, the values in this table do no fully explain the correlation over time between
these variables. The level of correlation between the CRA and the 10-year yields spread
changed as the crisis materialized. In fact, during this distress period the correlation
between these two variables changed, from around 4% to −88%. But not only did the
correlation between these two variables changed but so did the correlation between the
remaining variables and the spread with 8 out of 10 correlations with its sign changing
from one period to the next, being the exceptions for this result the inflation and gov-
ernment surplus. Moreover, for all the variables, the absolute value of the correlation
increased from the period before the crisis to the crisis one.
After the crisis period, correlations keeps enhancing becoming, most of them, more neg-
ative and thus revealing an adjustment lag between financial and macroeconomic funda-
mentals. Another motive for this might be the recovery of the economic results of the
countries after the crisis (increase of macroeconomic variables) and the generalized de-
17












































































































































































































































































Panel D: Post Crisis
Figure 3.1: Correlation heat maps of 10-year bond yields before, during and after crisis
In addition, it can be used the same methodology to analyze the correlation of either
the CRA or the yield spreads between countries during these periods. Figure 3.1 above
depicts the correlation heatmaps of the yield for the entire period (Panel A) and each of
the subperiods (Panel B through D) and is organized from non-PIIGS to PIIGS countries.
The first panel, which gives the correlation for the whole period, already signals the im-
pact of the crisis in some peripheral countries like Greece and Portugal with the yield
of these countries having a negative correlation with those fiscally stronger (non-PIIGS).
In the case of Ireland and Spain, even though they have a positive correlation with the
remaining countries, this is much lower than the correlation within the PIIGS or within
the non-PIIGS. On the contrary, the correlation between the PIIGS is considerably high
especially between Greece-Portugal and Ireland-Portugal indicating a possible contagion
effect between these countries.
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With the creation of the European Monetary Union (“EMU”) the countries that adopted
the Euro saw their yields decrease reflecting the elimination of exchange rate risk, the




















Source of data: Bloomberg
 
Government 10 year bond yields before Euro
Figure 3.2: Government 10 year bond yields
before Euro introduction
Likewise, the European Central Bank’s
practice of valuing all euro area countries’
bonds on the same terms as collateral for
central bank credit to banks led investors
to assume a similar risk for all countries.
Such convergence is observed in Panel B
of Figure 3.1 (Table A.10 of Appendix A)
where there is a high positive correlation
between all the countries that were in the process of entering the EMU in contrast with
























Source of data: Bloomberg
 
Government 10 year bond yields after Euro
Figure 3.3: Government 10 year bond yields
after Euro introduction
The implosion of the crisis, the quickly de-
terioration of macroeconomic fundamen-
tals for some countries and the rise of gov-
ernment debt to unbearable levels accen-
tuated fiscal stimulus measures on some
economies leading to increasing costs of
financing in the markets and, ultimately, to
divergences of the yields (Figure 3.3).
This reaction is clear in the negative correlation between the countries that were affected
the most by the crisis and those with stronger fiscal fundamentals revealing a shift of the
investors demand for countries’ debt from the first group to the latter (Figure 3.1, Panel C
and Table A.11 of Appendix A).
The reduction of the possibility of the collapse of the Euro on the post-crisis period, as-
sociated with the introduction of the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) and the
19
successful financial assistance programs of Ireland and Portugal relieved the markets and
led to an overall decrease of the yields in the EMU and, consequently, to a positive cor-
relation between the countries’ yield spreads - Panel D of Figure 3.1 and Table A.12 of
Appendix A.
Furthermore, Table A.13 through A.15 show the correlation matrices for each of the CRA.
In this regard, it is only analyzed the correlation between the countries with more signifi-
cant changes in ratings (countries that did not face a rating change over the period under
analysis do not have a correlation defined hence are depicted in the tables with a ".").
During the crisis period, Moody’s decreased “Portugal’s long-term government bond rat-
ings to Ba2 from Baa1 and assigned a negative outlook”3, not only on the basis of weak
macroeconomic fundamentals but also as a reaction of the situation lived in Greece. As
so, a high correlation level would be expected between these two countries. Furthermore,
it is equally expected a high correlation between these two countries and Ireland, the third
intervened country, as the situation in Greece also had an implication on Ireland’s rating
downgrades4.
In addition, one could also expect: (i) a contagion of the Portuguese situation to Spain,
as this country is a major holder of Portuguese debt5 and (ii) a higher correlation between
France, Italy and Spain and the remaining major economies than between these and the
intervened countries since a distress situation in France, Italy or Spain would have a higher
impact on European economies than the impact of a less economically powerful country
as Portugal, Greece or even Ireland.
All these relations can be seen the tables. It is shown the high correlation between Por-
tugal, Ireland and Greece signaling a contagion effect between these economies. Spain
3In “Moody’s downgrades Portugal to Ba2 with a negative outlook from Baa1” (https://www.
moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgradesPortugal-to-Ba2-with-a-negative-outlook-from?
lang=en&cy=global&docid=PR_222043)
4In “Moody’s downgrades Ireland to Ba1; outlook remains negative” (https://www.moodys.
com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Ireland-to-Ba1-outlook-remains-negative--PR_
222257)
5In “Eurozone debt web: Who owes what to whom? (http://www.bbc.com/news/
business-15748696)
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is highly affected by rating changes in Portugal with the CRA clearly relating its level of
risk with the amount of risky assets (Portuguese bonds) that it held.
Moreover, Spain, which had to intervene in the banking system with Madrid lending over
e40 billion to Spanish banks and nationalizing of Bankia6 (the country’s fourth-largest
bank by Tier 1 capital in 20147) saw their yield spreads vis-à-vis the Germand Bund
increase to levels around 6% in this period and several downgrades in the banking system
and the country’s ratings.
France, on the contrary, is the country with less impact in its ratings from the situation
lived in other economies. Yet, a change in the rating of France is more related with
changes in the ratings of Spain and Italy, as these are the major economies affected by the
sovereign debt crisis, and that are highly correlated between them.
Table A.16 through A.18 are for Moody’s ratings correlation before, during and after
crisis. This is also depicted in Figure 3.4 below, from Panel B through D, respectively.
In the pre-crisis period, there are no material changes in ratings with most of the coun-
tries maintaining its ratings for the entire period. In the crisis period, it is possible to
verify a high correlation between fiscally "weaker" countries and the absence of correla-
tion between these countries and fiscally stronger ones. France has a low correlation with
Portugal, Ireland or Greece and stronger one with other big economies as Spain or Italy.
On the other hand, these last two countries have a high positive correlation between them
and with the remaining PIIGS with the increase in stability of Italy leading to an absence
of correlation with Spain, Portugal, Ireland or Greece after this period.
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, on the contrary, have, as expected, a high positive
correlation both during and after the crisis with a persistence of high correlation between
Ireland and Portugal from one period to another and a decrease of correlation between
6In “Spain’s Bankia-Led Bailout Won’t Spell End of Bank Trou-
bles” (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-27/
spain-s-bankia-led-bailout-won-t-spell-end-of-troubles-for-banks)
7In “The top five Spanish banks” (http://www.thebanker.com/Banker-Data/
The-top-five-Spanish-banks)
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these countries and Greece. This result could be partially explained by the “end” of the
financial assistance program in Ireland in December 2013 followed, only a few months
later, by Portugal, leading to a regain of the market’s confidence and hence an increase in












































































































































































































































































Panel D: Post Crisis
Figure 3.4: Correlation heat maps of Moodys’ ratings before, during and after crisis
3.3.2 Models interpretation
Rating on yield
The initial model analyzed is the impact of CRA on the 10-year government bond yield
spreads of the countries. Beforehand, Table 2 (page 37) recapitulates the expected signals
of the impact of both different variables on the government bond yields and ratings.
With this information in mind, Table 3 (page 38) presents the results for the panel data
for the whole period, from the first quarter of 2002 until the last quarter of 2014 using,
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for that purpose, the formerly mentioned fixed effects. The models are divided by rating:
(i) Moody’s for 1 and 2; (ii) S&P for 3 and 4; and (iii) Fitch for 5 and 6. Moreover,
odd number models represent the simple fixed effects model while even number models
represent the simple fixed effect model but with heteroskedasticity-robust coefficients.
The most influential factors for the yield spreads of the countries are the ratings, inflation
and external balance, which are robustly statistically significant at least at a 10% signif-
icance level over the three CRA. Credit ratings and inflation have the expected impact
on yield spreads [an upgrade (increase) of the rating (inflation) decreases (increases) the
spread] but, on the other hand, government debt has a contradictory impact as an increase
of the indebtedness level decreases the yield spread. The minimum amount of govern-
ment debt around 24% of gross domestic product (“GDP”) and, specially a mean of 77%
of GDP over the whole period, might undervalue the impact of debt in the yields.
Another explanation is, again, the lag between financial and macroeconomic fundamen-
tals adjustments. After the crisis period (2013 onwards), and due to delivery of the assis-
tance programs tranches to Greece, Portugal and Ireland, these countries saw their debt
increase whereas the markets perception of risk eased and, consequently, the correspon-
dent government yield spreads decreased, vis-à-vis the German Bund, in the secondary
market.
The models obtained by this process point for similar results across the three CRA. As so,
it will be used Moody’s as a proxy for the impact of rating agencies in the yields spreads,
and vice-versa.
Greece has faced from severe macroeconomic issues. A high level of debt much before
the crisis (stabilized at a 100% of GDP during the 90’s, versus the 70% average of the
Euro area, and kept at this level until the crisis), the increase in the cost of refinancing,
poor fiscal fundamentals, a high level of unemployment and political instability lead to a
confidence crisis and consequently to outside intervention. Due to this, Greece’s macroe-
conomic and rating values are over-pessimistic when compared with the remaining coun-
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tries under analysis, even against Ireland and Portugal.
In this sense, and now that it has been covered the base model for the analysis of the yield
spreads for comparison, the first step will be to reestimate the model, again as panel data,
but without considering Greece. The robust results are in the first two columns (first with
Greece and second without) of Table 4 (page 38).
The not inclusion of Greece in the estimation provides much clearer analysis of the eco-
nomic situation lived in Europe. The first difference worth to emphasize is the decrease
of the constant (base level of the 10-year yield spread) by 8% indicating the impact of
Greece’s high level of 10-year yield spread over the whole period (Greece, within the
sample, reached a maximum value of 35% and had, more often than not, higher yields
than its counterpart countries).
Furthermore, not accounting for the default of a country in the estimation allows for the
CRA coefficient to decrease by almost one half, yet staying significant indicating that
CRA do have a role in the yield level of a country.
The two last significant changes are: (i) government surplus is now robustly significant at
a 10% significance level; and (ii) inflation, though its signal remains the same, becomes
statistically insignificant.
To account for the specificities in the data and the robustness of the results we included
several variables such as a dummy for the period with financial assistance (which de-
pended on the country) or variables to account for specific rules of the EMU as the deficit
above 3% or the debt level above 60%. These variables turned out statistically insignifi-
cant in the sample used.
Instead of a debt level above 60%, it was used a benchmark of 90% of GDP as a variable to
distinguish between countries. The robust results, which do not include Greece again, are
depicted in the third column of Table 4 [model (3)]. In this context, "Gov. Debt ≥ 90" is
an interaction term which represents the additional variation on the yield spread, by a 1%
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change of the government debt of a country which has a debt level as a percentage of GDP
above 90%. Comparing model (2) and (3), Gov. Debt ≥ 90 is not statistically significant
and the coefficient has a neutral value indicating that the increase of government debt
level by 1% is the same for countries with a high or low government debt.
Some literature also uses dummies for the crisis period, Greece or the PIGS to estimate
the impact of CRA on yields (see Gärtner et al. (2011) for comparative analysis). In light
of this procedure it was computed series of models using a specific dummy the crisis
period and an interaction term between Greece and the rating. The results are shown in
the last two columns of Table 4 and include the interaction term for a debt level higher
than 90% of GDP previously used.
Both these models give a similar result the one from the panel data analysis above.
Moody’s, government surplus and inflation are statistically significant and with identi-
cal signs but now external balance is no longer significant.
Furthermore, the interaction term between Moodys and Greece turned out to be statisti-
cally significant indicating that a downgrade of the Greek rating by one notch by Moody’s
has an impact on Greece’s yield spread approximately 0.4% higher than a similar decrease
on other countries’ rating. The dummy for the crisis period is also statistically significant
(at a 10% level) and indicates that in this period, the yield spread of the countries vis-à-vis
the German Bund is, ceteris paribus, 1.46% higher than in the remaining periods.
From all the previous models it is possible to see that the rating variable is always sta-
tistically significant, but how does the rating impact changes over time? Table 5 on page
39 depicts four robust models, where model 1, 2 ,3 and 4 are, respectively, for all sample
period, pre-crisis period, during crisis period and post-crisis period.
In what regards these periods, the variables do change over time both in signal and/or
significance. GDP growth, GDP per capita and government surplus are not significant in
any of the periods or when considering the entire sample period.
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An increase in the credit ratings has, as expected, a statistically significant negative impact
of the on yield spreads during the crisis - i.e., a downgrade of the rating leads to an increase
of the yield spreads. Additionally, the impact intensified during the crisis, from -0.08%
to -0.62%. Nevertheless, a high amount of downgrades during the crisis, even for fiscally
stable countries which did not face a spike in their yield spreads, could have reduced the
expected impact of the ratings on the yields.
During this period, not only the majority of the countries faced a rating change (either
of credit watch or effective rating change), but the rating changes themselves were larger
than in other periods. Thus, yield spreads are explained by a change in the rating but, more
importantly, by the magnitude of this change (for Greece, the magnitude of the change on
the rating was of 16 leading to a change in the yield spread, ceteris paribus, of 9.92%).
In the post-crisis period, and although it is not statistically significant, the impact of rat-
ings on yields eases to -0.41% indicating that a rating upgrade, in this period, had a lower
impact on the yield spreads than a similar downgrade during the crisis period. Moreover,
this results partly reflects the inertia of the ratings when considering the fact that yield
spreads decreased sharply to minimum historical values while ratings felt slight upgrades.
These results clearly indicate that the credit ratings do/did have an impact on the sovereign
yield spreads of the countries and that, due to the high amount of downgrades, ended up
aggravating the crisis in Europe.
Yield on rating
Table 6 on page 39 depicts the results for the base model for equation 3.2, where the first
and second column for each rating represents the non-robust and robust model, respec-
tively. In all three models (for each CRA), government surplus, unemployment, govern-
ment debt and the yield spread are robustly statistically significant. Moreover, GDP per
capita, government surplus and external balance have the opposite signal to the one men-
tioned by the literature indicating that, the higher is the government surplus or GDP per
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capita, the lower will be the credit rating, ceteris paribus.
Inflation, which is statistically insignificant to help explaining all the three ratings, also
has the opposite signal indicating that a higher inflation leads to better ratings. The low
variability of this variable, both considering all sample period or within each subperiod,
may lead to such result. Focusing on the yield spread, in what regards all the CRA, an
increase of 2% of the yield spread would lead to a reduction of the rating of, at least, 0.5
which is equivalent to a negative credit watch.
Again, for the remaining of the analysis, and considering the similarity of the results, it
will be only used the Moody’s rating as a proxy for the ratings.
Previously, the model with or without Greece provided a different insight about the yields
estimation. A similar procedure is done for the ratings and the results are depicted in
the first two columns Table 7 (model 1 and 2 with and without Greece, respectively) on
page 40. Now, the non-inclusion of Greece slightly changes the previous results with an
increase of 2% on the yield spread leading to a decrease by 1 notch of the rating. The
inclusion of interaction term for debt higher than 90% of GDP, as presented in the third
model of Table 7, reduces the impact of a change of yield spreads on ratings and it is, now,
statistically significant. In this case, an increase in government debt of a country with a
debt higher than 90% of GDP has, ceteris paribus, higher decrease of the rating than a
similar change in a country with a more stable fiscal situation.
The last two columns present a model including a dummy for the crisis period and the
interaction term for the debt as above mentioned, with (4) and without Greece (5). The
results are fairly similar to the ones previously obtained with the dummy for the crisis
period being statistically significant in both models and indicating that, during this period,
the rating is higher, ceteris paribus. This unexpected value is offset by the increase,
comparing to column four, of the absolute impact of a change of the yield spread on the
rating. The average yield spread during this period is 2.40% against 0.11% and 1.75%
of the pre- and post-crisis ones. Moreover, the highest value of the yield spread that was
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verified in this is around 33% considering Greece, a much larger value than 1.14% and
11.15% for the other periods. In this sense, the value of the dummy is completely offset
by a positive change on the yields of 2% which, during this period, was verified for the
majority of the countries studied. The countries for which this dummy has a clear impact
are the ones with a more stable fiscal situation as Austria, Finland or Netherlands.
Table 8 (page 41) decomposes the rating estimation for the 4 periods under analysis (all
sample, pre-, during- and post-crisis) with and without Greece. The first different result
is that, before the crisis, none of the variables had a statistically significant impact on the
rating contradicting the results existing in the literature. Nevertheless, this period was a
relatively stable one, a period which followed an effort by the countries to fulfill the euro
convergence criteria introduced by the Maastricht Treaty: (i) price stability (via HCPI);
(ii) sound public finances (government deficit not more than 3% of GDP); (iii) sustain-
able public finances (government deficit not more than 60% of GDP); (iv) durability of
convergence (via long-term interest rates); and (v) exchange rate stability, which had to
be met in order for the countries to be eligible to enter the EMU.
Furthermore, the European Central Bank’s practice of valuing all euro area countries’
bonds on the same terms as collateral for central bank credit to banks led investors to
assume a similar risk for all countries. As so, these countries faced a period where they
were considered fiscally stable and their creditworthiness similar with all having invest-
ment grade ratings (mean of Aa1/AA+) with very low variability, explaining the results.
For the subsequent period, and considering Greece, four variables (GDP growth, unem-
ployment, the interaction term for government debt higher than 90% of GDP and external
balance) are now statistically significant with the external balance having an opposite sign
to the one expected and mentioned in the literature. Moreover, the 10-year yield spread
is not statistically significant and has a negative impact on the rating. Keeping the re-
maining values constant, a 5% increase in the yield spread during this period would lead
a downgrade by one notch of the rating. Considering the high spread increases verified
28
during this period, this results provides information about why ratings of “weaker” coun-
tries were downgrade by such a large amount (a 15% increase on the yield spread, as the
one in Greece, would lead to downgrade of three notches).
The exclusion of Greece from the sample makes the yield spread statistically significant
though GDP growth and unemployment are no longer significant. Now, the 10% increase
in the spread of Portugal during the crisis period would traduce into a downgrade of seven
notches of Moody’s rating.
The post-crisis period provides a different insight and, with the inclusion of Greece, no
variables are statistically significant indicating, again, the existence of ratings inertia after
a crisis period as mentioned by Mora (2006). The exclusion of Greece from the sample
makes government debt and the yield spread statistically significant variables and a 3%
decrease in the Portuguese spread would lead to a an upgrade of the rating by one notch
and a positive credit watch (a numerical value of 1.5), ceteris paribus. During this period,
Portugal did face indeed an upgrade by two notches of the Moody’s rating yet, high levels
of government debt and lower decreases of the spread than the increase verified during
the crisis could help explain the inertia of the ratings in this last period.
So far, it has been shown that, during the crisis, ratings had an impact on spreads (and
spreads on ratings if Greece is excluded from the sample) helping a self-fulfilling prophecy
on the countries instability at a structural and markets level. For the remaining periods,
and if Greece is included, the two variables revealed not to be statistically significant.
Moreover, before the crisis, none of the variables here studied had an impact either on the
ratings or on yield spreads.
As mentioned before, a different approach to analyze what determines the ratings is to use
an ordered probit model as in equation 3.3. Table 9 on page 42 depicts the ordered probit
model to determine the Moody’s rating for all the sample period, the pre-crisis period, the
crisis period and the post-crisis period.
Contrary to previous results, in which no variables were statistically significant, with the
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inclusion of Greece, in the pre-crisis period, GDP per capita, unemployment and govern-
ment debt are statistically significant in all four periods. External balance is statistically
significant in every period with the exception of the post-crisis one and GDP growth and
10-year yield spreads are only statistically significant in this last period.
In the pre-crisis period, an increase in the GDP per capita, government debt or external
balance would result in the expected change in the rating. Unemployment, on the con-
trary, has an unexpected impact, with an increase in the unemployment level of a country,
leading to an upgrade of the rating.
With the exception of Greece, GDP per capita has a positive trend throughout time in
all the countries yet the stagnation on the last two periods for some countries and the
decrease of this variable in Greece, Italy or Portugal to levels similar to late 2003/early
2004 together with the downgrade during the crisis and then the slight improvement of the
ratings in the post-crisis period might explain why this variable has slight positive impact
during the crisis and negative in post-crisis model, respectively.
Furthermore, the impact of the yield spread more than doubles from the crisis period to
the post-crisis one which could be due, as previously mentioned, to a larger change of the
yield spread relative to the change in the ratings after the crisis than during it reflecting
the fact that, after the crisis, yield spreads dropped to levels closer to the ones before the
crisis but the ratings were not upgraded to the levels before the crisis or similar.
The case which better exemplifies this situation is the Greek one where yield spread de-
creased, from a peak during the crisis of 33% to a value around 4% (before the crisis the
yield was around 0.5%) yet the rating only faced an upgrade from a default level of C (a
numerical value of 2) to Caa1 (6) - the rating before the crisis was A1 (18) with Ireland,
Portugal or Spain having similar situations.
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Conclusion
The objective of this study was to assess the extent of influence of credit rating announce-
ments on sovereign bond yield and the influence of a change on the yields to credit rating
focusing on the European market.
For this purpose it was used 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads, vis-à-vis the German
Bund, and macroeconomic data from 12 European economies for a period between 2002
and 2014 and divided into three major periods: (i) the period before the crisis (from the
first quarter of 2002 until the second quarter of 2008); (ii) the financial crisis and the
sovereign debt crisis period (third quarter of 2008 until the last quarter of 2012); and (iii)
the period after the crisis (first quarter of 2013 until the last quarter of 2014).
We estimated the impact of credit rating announcements (i.e., changes in rating grades
and credit watch), made by Moody’s (as a benchmark) throughout these periods, focusing
the study on two models: (i) panel data regression models including dummy variables
for different situations; and (ii) ordered models. The main contribution is providing an
updated study on the impact of credit rating agencies and spreads on one another not
limiting the study to selected periods (such as the crisis) and extending previous analysis
to a period after a crisis.
The findings from the empirical parts of this study confirm that ratings changes did have
a negative impact on the yield spreads when considering the whole sample period. These
results confirms expectations that ratings have an impact on the yields and do confirm
some of the outcomes indicated literature. Furthermore, some macroeconomic fundamen-
tals estimators revealed to be statistically insignificant (either for the full sample period
and/or some subperiods) and presented a sign contrary to those expected and previously
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studied by the majority of the references above.
Regarding the analysis per sub-period, the results vary for the different periods. For the
first methodology (i.e., panel regressions), confirm that ratings had an impact on the yield
spreads during the crisis though, both in the pre- and post-crisis period, this impact is
not statistically significant. Moreover, the inclusion of different dummy variables and
interaction terms turned out to be statistically insignificant and inconclusive regarding its
impact on yield spreads including the interaction term for government debt higher than
90% of GDP. Other variables as the interaction term of Moody’s and Greece and a dummy
for the crisis period turned out to be statistically significant indicating that yield spreads
tend to be higher during a crisis and that a change in Moody’s rating had a higher impact
on Greece than a similar one for the remaining countries.
The study of the impact of the yield on the credit ratings provided similar results in both
methodologies when considering the 12 years under analysis. Both models indicate that
yield spreads had an impact on the ratings. Moreover, the majority of the variables had
an impact on the ratings which goes according to what one might expect considering that
credit ratings provide information about present and future state of the economy.
The division in subperiods provide a different insight. The first methodology indicates
that, before the crisis, none of the variables had a statistically significant impact on
the rating and only during and after the crisis some variables, including the sovereign
yield spread (if Greece is excluded), had a significant impact on the ratings. The second
methodology shows that variables provide information on rating changes in all the three
subperiods. Yield spreads contribute to the determination of credit ratings before and
during the crisis, if Greece is not considered though, in the last period, spreads provide
information both with and without Greece in the sample. The differences obtained with
and without Greece are due to the values of Greece’s spreads and ratings during the period
under analysis which could be considered as outliers comparing to other countries’. In
this sense, its removal from the sample leads to more precise results.
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In light of the above, it is possible to assume that, during the crisis, ratings announcements
(either credit watch or rating changes) and the information that it provides to the markets
had a direct impact on sovereign yields. However, during the remaining periods analyzed,
the results do not show that, these same announcements provide enough information to
significantly change yields on the secondary markets. The results with Greece, on the
contrary, do not provide clear information about the effect of the increase of spreads
during the crisis and the decrease after, on ratings.
The possible extensions of this study are diverse. Given the methodology and the results, it
is suggested to apply it to often forgotten bond markets of emerging countries. Moreover,
it would be interesting to apply these model to more countries and for a broader period or
even different crisis (as the Asian crisis) and compare for the same different subperiods
(before, during and after a crisis).
Finally, there are several suggested adjustments that could improve the informative value
of this study. An increased of the number of countries could reflect better the reality
in the European market in each of the three periods though different time periods might
have to be considered. Furthermore, some of the analysis in this study revealed to be
inconclusive unless Greece was excluded from the sample. As so, the introduction of
correction instruments for extreme values could improve the models. This paper focused
only on the reaction of yields and ratings to one another however, it could be interesting to
analyze how other variables affect themselves in the different periods for macroeconomics
purposes. Moreover, it would be interesting to test the causality effect of these variables
with the introduction of a panel VAR model analysis.
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Figure 1 (Cont.): Rantings and yields evolution
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Tables
Table 1: Rating conversion
Credit Rating Moody’s S&P/Fitch Numerical Value
Investment Aaa AAA 22









Speculative Ba1 BB+ 12














Table 2: Variables expected signal
Expected signal
Dependent 10-year Ratingvariable yield spread
GDP growth - +
GDP per capita - +
Gov. Surplus - +
Inflation + -
Unemployment + -
Gov. Debt + -




10 yr. yield spread -
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Table 3: Explaining 10 year yield spreads with credit ratings
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Fitch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth −0.38∗∗∗ −0.38 −0.30∗∗∗ −0.30 −0.43∗∗∗ −0.43
(−5.60) (−1.49) (−5.07) (−1.75) (−6.29) (−1.48)
GDP per capita 0.07 0.07 −0.12 −0.12 0.15 0.15
(0.70) (0.55) (−1.25) (−0.98) (1.40) (1.22)
Gov. Surplus −0.04∗∗ −0.04 −0.04∗∗ −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
(−2.80) (−2.13) (−3.03) (−2.10) (−1.70) (−1.63)
Inflation 0.19∗ 0.19∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(2.26) (2.70) (2.69) (3.41) (2.45) (2.74)
Unemployment 0.02 0.02 −0.03 −0.03 0.05 0.05
(0.53) (0.16) (−0.82) (−0.27) (1.13) (0.43)
Gov. Debt −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02
(−3.73) (−1.75) (−6.30) (−1.55) (−3.36) (−1.70)
External balance −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗
(−4.35) (−3.25) (−5.25) (−2.78) (−4.41) (−3.12)
Moody’s Ratings −0.75∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗
(−14.20) (−3.38)
Standard & Poor’s Ratings −1.13∗∗∗ −1.13∗
(−20.07) (−2.92)
Fitch Ratings −0.92∗∗∗ −0.92∗
(−12.66) (−2.90)
Constant 17.03∗∗∗ 17.03∗ 27.18∗∗∗ 27.18∗ 19.51∗∗∗ 19.51∗
(10.13) (3.03) (15.93) (2.65) (9.61) (2.67)
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.68 0.68 0.57 0.57
F-Statistic 101.67 309.46 147.22 195.21 92.30 269.27
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Akaike’s info criterion 2184.44 2182.44 2049.21 2047.21 2216.71 2214.71
Schwarz info criterion 2223.58 2217.23 2088.35 2082.00 2255.85 2249.50
Observations 572 572 572 572 572 572
The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
Table 4: Explaining 10 year yield spreads with and without Greece and dummies
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)signal
GDP growth - −0.38 −0.11 −0.11 −0.33 −0.16
(−1.49) (−1.11) (−1.08) (−1.51) (−1.05)
GDP per capita - 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.13 −0.09
(0.55) (0.58) (0.54) (1.37) (−0.71)
Gov. Surplus - −0.04 −0.03∗ −0.03∗ −0.06∗ −0.02
(−2.13) (−2.60) (−2.32) (−2.50) (−1.57)
Inflation + 0.19∗ 0.15 0.15 0.19∗ 0.18∗
(2.70) (1.81) (1.67) (2.63) (2.69)
Unemployment + 0.02 0.12 0.12 −0.08 −0.13
(0.16) (1.67) (1.63) (−0.48) (−0.79)
Gov. Debt + −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(−1.75) (−0.95) (−0.72) (−0.14) (−1.30)
External balance - −0.08∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.07∗ −0.03 −0.01
(−3.25) (−2.60) (−2.77) (−0.98) (−0.25)
Moody’s Ratings - −0.75∗∗ −0.44∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗
(−3.38) (−4.47) (−7.17) (−4.46) (−5.01)
Gov. Debt ≥ 90 + −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(−0.17) (−0.41) (0.60)




Constant 17.03∗ 8.90∗∗ 9.06∗∗∗ 12.40∗∗ 15.51∗∗
(3.03) (3.92) (5.59) (3.89) (4.37)
R-squared 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.69
F-Statistic 309.46 502.44 5720.54 . .
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 . .
Akaike’s info criterion 2182.44 1296.94 1298.76 2118.89 2039.57
Schwarz info criterion 2217.23 1330.97 1337.04 2158.04 2083.07
Observations 572 520 520 572 572
The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 5: Explaining sovereign 10 year yield spreads for each period with dummies
All sample Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP growth −0.36 −0.01 −0.24 −0.28
(−1.50) (−1.42) (−1.14) (−1.23)
GDP per capita 0.06 0.01 −0.20 0.25
(0.47) (0.18) (−0.56) (0.74)
Gov. Surplus −0.04 −0.00 0.03 −0.04
(−2.09) (−0.32) (0.86) (−1.50)
Inflation 0.18∗ 0.01 0.13 −0.01
(2.42) (0.83) (1.60) (−0.12)
Unemployment −0.01 −0.04∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.15
(−0.09) (−2.60) (3.31) (0.89)
Gov. Debt −0.01 0.01 −0.00 −0.07∗
(−0.76) (1.77) (−0.09) (−2.30)
Gov. Debt ≥ 90 −0.01 −0.00∗ −0.00 −0.01∗
(−1.51) (−2.35) (−0.00) (−2.86)
External balance −0.09∗∗ −0.00 −0.10∗ −0.03
(−3.50) (−1.11) (−3.17) (−1.85)
Moody’s Ratings −0.82∗∗ −0.08 −0.62∗∗∗ −0.42
(−3.41) (−1.13) (−7.64) (−1.62)
Constant 18.27∗∗ 1.65 12.78∗∗∗ 12.93
(3.18) (1.13) (5.66) (1.80)
R-squared 0.60 0.09 0.65 0.53
F-Statistic 647.25 2039.51 2579.59 3931.07
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Akaike’s info criterion 2172.48 −263.18 818.25 175.42
Schwarz info criterion 2211.62 −230.27 847.84 197.71
Observations 572 286 198 88
The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 6: Explaining ratings with 10 year yield spreads
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Fitch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.05 −0.05
(−0.26) (−0.43) (−0.36) (−0.65) (−1.30) (−1.63)
GDP per capita 0.08 0.08 −0.12∗ −0.12 0.15∗∗ 0.15
(1.07) (0.44) (−2.13) (−1.09) (2.65) (1.27)
Gov. Surplus −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(−9.47) (−4.49) (−7.45) (−4.56) (−7.88) (−4.25)
Inflation 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (1.07) (0.77) (0.29) (0.20)
Unemployment −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗
(−13.39) (−2.66) (−11.72) (−4.62) (−13.59) (−3.06)
Gov. Debt −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗
(−13.30) (−2.91) (−14.65) (−2.97) (−13.88) (−3.01)
External balance −0.03 −0.03 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.02∗ −0.02
(−1.96) (−0.63) (−3.49) (−1.77) (−2.05) (−0.86)
10-year yield spread −0.35∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗
(−14.20) (−4.24) (−20.07) (−13.04) (−12.66) (−3.77)
Constant 26.53∗∗∗ 26.53∗∗∗ 26.15∗∗∗ 26.15∗∗∗ 24.73∗∗∗ 24.73∗∗∗
(48.13) (20.30) (63.66) (27.13) (57.79) (31.39)
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86
F-Statistic 425.34 1622.12 530.09 2602.05 422.99 513.82
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Akaike’s info criterion 1752.80 1750.80 1416.67 1414.67 1463.40 1461.40
Schwarz info criterion 1791.94 1785.59 1455.81 1449.47 1502.54 1496.19
Observations 572 572 572 572 572 572
The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
39
Table 7: Explaining ratings with and without Greece and dummies
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)signal
GDP growth + −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08∗
(−0.43) (−0.24) (0.31) (2.09) (2.40)
GDP per capita + 0.08 0.04 −0.01 −0.07 −0.12
(0.44) (0.22) (−0.07) (−0.42) (−0.70)
Gov. Surplus + −0.10∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(−4.49) (−3.85) (−3.80) (−4.16) (−3.31)
Inflation - 0.00 0.06 0.02 −0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.51) (0.21) (−0.14) (0.38)
Unemployment - −0.36∗ −0.15 −0.16∗ −0.36∗ −0.16∗
(−2.66) (−1.93) (−2.69) (−2.87) (−2.72)
Gov. Debt - −0.05∗ −0.06∗ −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(−2.91) (−2.88) (−1.82) (−1.64) (−2.12)
External balance + −0.03 −0.07 −0.08∗ −0.02 −0.06∗
(−0.63) (−2.25) (−2.86) (−0.57) (−2.80)
10-year yield spread - −0.35∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗
(−4.24) (−5.36) (−3.98) (−4.56) (−4.84)
Gov. Debt ≥ 90 - −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.02
(−2.69) (−2.27) (−1.93)
Crisis - 0.75∗ 0.83∗
(2.85) (2.92)
Constant 26.53∗∗∗ 25.81∗∗∗ 24.92∗∗∗ 26.38∗∗∗ 25.76∗∗∗
(20.30) (16.11) (18.20) (19.82) (16.68)
R-squared 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.87
F-Statistic 1622.12 16782.08 266.20 564571.24 .
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
Akaike’s info criterion 1750.80 1464.83 1360.11 1625.07 1298.89
Schwarz info criterion 1785.59 1498.86 1398.39 1668.56 1337.18
Observations 572 520 520 572 520






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for the entire sample period
Obs. Mean Var. Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
10 year bond yield 611 4.20 6.72 2.59 0.00 34.96
10 year bond yield spread 572 1.15 8.21 2.86 −0.66 33.13
GDP growth 624 0.23 1.17 1.08 −6.90 5.90
GDP per capita 624 7.26 3.32 1.82 3.30 11.40
Gov. Surplus 624 −3.79 29.34 5.42 −43.10 10.80
Inflation 624 0.49 0.66 0.81 −2.10 3.60
Unemployment 624 8.82 21.94 4.68 2.50 27.90
Gov. Debt 624 76.59 947.21 30.78 23.70 177.40
External balance 624 2.58 144.96 12.04 −19.81 51.50
Moody’s Ratings 624 19.99 14.62 3.82 2.00 22.00
S&P 624 19.89 12.36 3.52 1.00 22.00
Fitch Ratings 624 20.14 10.27 3.21 5.00 22.00
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics pre-crisis period
Obs. Mean Var. Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
10 year bond yield 306 4.19 0.35 0.59 0.00 5.57
10 year bond yield spread 286 0.11 0.07 0.26 −0.66 1.14
GDP growth 312 0.61 0.78 0.88 −4.10 5.90
GDP per capita 312 6.94 3.11 1.76 3.30 11.40
Gov. Surplus 312 −1.90 17.56 4.19 −18.10 10.80
Inflation 312 0.63 0.54 0.74 −1.40 2.50
Unemployment 312 7.23 5.20 2.28 2.60 12.00
Gov. Debt 312 63.86 646.12 25.42 23.70 110.50
External balance 312 1.79 128.16 11.32 −19.81 47.11
Moody’s Ratings 312 21.24 1.61 1.27 17.00 22.00
S&P Ratings 312 21.04 2.39 1.55 17.00 22.00
Fitch Ratings 312 21.09 2.02 1.42 17.00 22.00
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics crisis period
Obs. Mean Var. Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
10 year bond yield 209 4.75 15.95 3.99 1.32 34.96
10 year bond yield spread 198 2.40 18.23 4.27 0.07 33.13
GDP growth 216 −0.28 1.60 1.26 −6.90 3.20
GDP per capita 216 7.50 3.00 1.73 3.90 10.30
Gov. Surplus 216 −6.48 38.26 6.19 −43.10 4.50
Inflation 216 0.46 0.76 0.87 −1.70 3.60
Unemployment 216 9.72 25.19 5.02 2.50 26.30
Gov. Debt 216 83.81 808.05 28.43 28.80 170.30
External balance 216 2.18 140.80 11.87 −17.80 41.95
Moody’s Ratings 216 19.52 19.03 4.36 2.00 22.00
S&P Ratings 216 19.31 16.94 4.12 1.00 22.00
Fitch Ratings 216 19.79 12.88 3.59 5.00 22.00
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics post-crisis period
Obs. Mean Var. Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
10 year bond yield 96 3.03 5.09 2.26 0.54 12.44
10 year bond yield spread 88 1.75 4.88 2.21 0.11 11.15
GDP growth 96 0.18 0.44 0.66 −3.70 2.30
GDP per capita 96 7.72 4.14 2.04 3.70 10.40
Gov. Surplus 96 −3.88 20.06 4.48 −29.80 4.50
Inflation 96 0.11 0.64 0.80 −2.10 1.90
Unemployment 96 11.93 49.97 7.07 4.80 27.90
Gov. Debt 96 101.70 979.78 31.30 53.80 177.40
External balance 96 6.04 197.93 14.07 −17.92 51.50
Moody’s Ratings 96 17.02 33.02 5.75 2.00 22.00
S&P Ratings 96 17.48 23.97 4.90 7.00 22.00
Fitch Ratings 96 17.83 22.94 4.79 5.00 22.00
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